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Loss of Consortium in Admiralty: A Yet Unsettled 
Question 
An action for loss of consortium, which is typically defined 
to include the right to one's spouse's society, love, services, affec-
tion, company, and companionship, including sexual relations, is 
generally allowed among American common law jurisdictions in 
the instance of the death or serious injury of the marriage part-
ner. 1 In the American admiralty jurisdiction, however, the exis-
tence of such a cause of action when the spouse is seriously in-
jured is unclear. 
The Supreme Court's recent admiralty decision in Sea-Land 
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 2 which permitted recovery for loss of 
society and services by a longshoreman's widow, left confusion in 
its wake as to a loss of consortium action in maritime law by one 
whose spouse is injured but not killed. Admiralty courts subse-
quently facing the question in nonfatal cases are polarized. Some 
lower courts, in allowing the nonfatal action, have seen a natural 
progression from the Supreme Court's granting recovery for the 
societal losses encompassed in consortium in the case of the 
spouse's death3 to extending relief in situations in which the 
spouse is seriously, but not fatally, injured! A federal district 
court and a court of appeals, however, denied the cause of action, 
with the court of appeals interpreting Gaudet as suggesting that 
no recovery should be granted in nonfatal cases. 5 
This comment will examine the origins of the present uncer-
tainty and will suggest a possible resolution of the question of 
recovery in admiralty for negligent invasion of consortium. 
1. For a discussion of the present status of consortium actions among the states, see 
notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra. For typical definitions of consortium, see, e.g., 
lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 260 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
376 U.S. 949 (1964); Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
340 U.S. 852 (1950) (overruled on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 
226 (D.C. Cir. 1957)). 
2. 414 u.s. 573 (1974). 
3. ld. at 584. 
4. Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (loss of consor-
tium recoverable even when spouse is only injured); Pesce v. Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App. 
3d 86, 92, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451, 454-55 (1975) (wife's recovery allowable); cf. Francis v. Pan 
Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 n.8 (D. Del. 1975) (claim dismissed on other 
grounds). 
5. Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1976) (wife's loss 
of consortium claim denied). The lower court decision from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Louisiana is unreported. 
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I. Loss oF CoNSORTIUM AT CoMMON LAw 
The corpus of American maritime law is basically indepen-
dent of the common law, but admiralty courts have often looked 
to the common law position in addressing unanswered questions 
in the maritime jurisdiction. 8 This practice has been specifically 
applied in admiralty to questions regarding the protection of con-
sortium and other societal interests between spouses and other 
family members. 7 
The traditional rule at common law was that a husband 
could recover for loss of consortium caused by negligent injury to 
his wife.8 A major element of damages was the lost services of his 
wife9 in addition to the usual nonpecuniary entitlements such as 
society, companionship, and affection.10 The wife, however, was 
held to have no property right in the services of her husband 11 
and, lacking power to sue in her own right, could not maintain 
such a cause of action. 12 • 
Although the husband's right of action for loss of consortium 
was clear if his wife was not fatally injured, no cause of action 
existed if she died from the injuries. 13 If one's spouse was killed 
as a result of a tortfeasor's negligence, early common law denied 
any recovery for injury to the societal relationships of the family 
members, since torts were not considered to survive death. 14 
With the subsequent creation of wrongful death statutes, 
however, states gradually began to grant recoveries for negli-
6. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970); The 
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886); Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 
F.2d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 1969); lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 259-
60 (2d Cir. 1963). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY§ 1-16, at 45-
47 (2d ed. 1975). 
7. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 & n.21 (1974); 
lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1963). 
8. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 651, 652-54 (1930). 
9. Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 
1341, 1343 (1961). 
10. E.g., Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 274, 78 N.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1956); Note, 
Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1341, 1343 
(1961). 
11. E.g., Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 68, 206 S.W. 23, 24 (1918). 
12. Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1341, 1344 (1961). In Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 278, 78 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1956), 
wherein the Iowa high court granted a wife's recovery, it was aptly stated that "at common 
law the husband and wife were considered as one, and he was the one." 
13. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); 1 S. SPEISER, REcoVERY FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:1 (2d ed. 1975). 
14. See Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 
13, § 1:1. 
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gently inflicted death, 15 which often included compensation for 
the societal losses included in consortium.18 Such statutory recov-
eries in death actions were not restricted to the husband as in the 
case of nonfatal actions for loss of consortium. 17 
The advent of the Married Women's Acts granting a wife the 
power to sue18 produced changes in the nonfatal actions for loss 
of consortium. Gradually, most American jurisdictions altered 
their position to extend protection to the wife's marital consor-
tium interests as well as the husband's.t9 Some states, however, 
placed the wife and husband on equal footing by denying recovery 
to both.20 
Presently, only ten states continue to deny recovery for loss 
of consortium to both husband and wife.21 Thirty-nine American 
jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, 
recognize the cause of action of both husband and wife for loss of 
consortium in nonfatal injury cases.22 Three states have taken no 
15. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 13, § 1:9. 
16. E.g., Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776, 778 (Fla. 1954); Graysonia-Nashville 
Lumber Co. v. Carroll, 102 Ark. 460, 470, 144 S.W. 519, 522 (1912); Fuchs v. Kansas City 
S. Ry., 132 La. 782, 794, 61 So. 790, 794 (1912). See generally 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 13, 
§ 3:49. 
17. E.g., Davis v. North Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 584-85, 295 P. 921, 924 
(1931); Brickman v. Southern Ry., 74 S.C. 306, 319, 54 S.E. 553, 557 (1904); Wells v. 
Denver & R.G.W. Ry., 7 Utah 482,485-86,27 P. 688,689 (1891). See generally 1 S. SPEISER, 
supra note 13, § 3:49. 
18. Under the Married Women's Acts married women were released from common 
law disabilities and granted the same legal rights as if they were unmarried. E.g., ARiz. 
REv. STAT. § 25-214 (1976); Cow. REv. STAT. § 14-2-202 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 209, § 6 (West Cum. Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CoDE§ 26.16.150 (1961). 
19. For a discussion of the states extending a right of action to wives for loss of 
consortium, see note 22 and accompanying text infra. 
20. E.g., Baldwin v. ·State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965); Lockwood v. Wilson H. 
Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1976). 
21. Connecticut: Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); 
Louisiana: McKey v. Dow Chern. Co., 295 So. 2d 516 (La. Ct. App. 1974); New Mexico: 
Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963); North Carolina: Hinnant v. 
Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Texas: Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 
271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954); Utah: UTAH CoDE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1976); Vermont: 
Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965); Virginia: VA. CoDE§ 55-36 (1974); 
Washington: Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953); Wyoming: 
Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. 1971). 
22. The following jurisdictions judicially declared the right to recover for loss of 
consortium: Alabama: Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d 881 
(1974); Alaska: Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alas. 1974); Arizona: City of Glendale v. 
Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Arkansas: Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. 
Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); California: Rod~iguez v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Delaware: Yonner v. Adams, 
167 A.2d 717 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961); Florida: Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); 
Georgia: Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); 
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definitive stand, although two of these have implied that recovery 
would be granted, and the third has granted recovery to the hus-
band. 23 In the case of the spouse's death, a majority of the states 
allow recovery for injury to a widow's or widower's consortium 
interests in wrongful death actions. 24 
II. SOCIETAL LOSSES AT EARLY ADMIRALTY 
A. Wrongful Death Actions 
Early admiralty cases recognized a general maritime cause 
of action for wrongful death. Some of the first admiralty refer-
ences to elements of damage included in consortium were in those 
cases wherein recovery for lost society, services, and comfort was 
granted to parents, husbands, wives, and siblings of persons in-
jured in maritime accidents.25 Illustrative of the rationale used in 
Idaho: Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562 (1966); Illinois: Dini v. Naiditch, 
20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Indiana: Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 
800 (1969); Iowa: Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N .W .2d 480 (1956); Kentucky: Kotsiris 
v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Maryland: Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 
Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Massachusetts: Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 
N.E.2d 555 (1973); Michigan: Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 
(1960); Minnesota: Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969); 
Missouri: Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Montana: 
Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961) (applying Montana 
law); Nebraska: Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953) (applying Nebraska 
law); Nevada: General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); New Jersey: 
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); New York: Millington 
v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968); 
Ohio: Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 
(1970); Pennsylvania: Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973); 
Puerto Rico: Gonzalez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 140 (D.P.R. 1974) (apply-
ing Puerto Rican law); South Dakota: Hoekstra v. Helgeland,78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 
(1959); Wisconsin: Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 
137 (1967). 
Ten states have statutorily created the cause of action: Colorado: CoLO. REv. STAT. § 
14-2-209 (1973); Kansas: Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 172, § 5, 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws 663; 
Maine: ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19, § 167-A (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mississippi: Miss. CoDE ANN. 
§ 93-3-1 (1972); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1968); Oklahoma: 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15 (West 1976); Oregon: OR. REv. STAT.§ 108.010 (1975); South 
Carolina: S.C. CoDE§ 10:2593 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Tennessee: TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 25-109 
(Cum. Supp. 1976); West Virginia: W.VA. CODE§ 48-3-19a (1976). 
23. Hawaii: Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (implying wife's 
right to recover for loss of consortium); North Dakota: Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 
N.W.2d 530 (1947) (granting a husband's recovery); Rhode Island: Mariani v. Nanni, 95 
R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119 (1962) (implying wife's right to recover for loss of consortium). 
24. Speiser identifies at least 30 states that permit recovery for the damage elements 
normally included in consortium. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 13, § 3:49. 
25. E.g., The E.B. Ward, Jr., 23 F. 900, 901-02 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885); The Sea Gull, 
21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1865) (No. 12,578); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. 
Cas. 891, 892 (Story, Circuit Justice, 1827) (No. 11,233); The Garland, 5 F. 924, 925 (E.D. 
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justifying such recoveries was the principle espoused by Chief 
Justice Chase in The Sea Gull. 26 He commented that "it better 
becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in ad-
miralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required 
to withhold it by established and inflexible rules. " 27 
In a later case, The Harrisburg, the Supreme Court abolished 
the general maritime wrongful death cause of action, 28 holding 
that any such action would have to be created by statute as in 
land based law.29 The Court did not question the propriety of the 
damage elements, such as loss of society, which had been pre-
viously pursued in wrongful death actions, but merely required 
statutory authorization for wrongful death suits before further 
recoveries could be contemplated for societal or any other losses 
arising from death. 30 
B. Consortium Recoveries by Husbands in Injury Cases 
In addition to the pre-Harrisburg recoveries for loss of com-
fort, society, and services in cases of fatality, compensation was 
also awarded to husbands in admiralty courts for these elements 
in cases of nonfatal injuries to their wives. 31 In 1912, the right of 
a husband to maintain such a claim in admiralty was challenged 
in New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 32 wherein 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 
a damage award to an injured steamboat passenger's husband for 
his loss of her aid, comfort, and society.33 In upholding the exist-
ence of the husband's cause of action in admiralty, the court cited 
Mich. 1881); Cutting v. Seabury, 6 F. Cas. 1083, 1084 (D. Mass. 1860) (No. 3521) (dis-
missed on other grounds). 
26. 21 F. Cas. 909 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1865) (No. 12,578). 
27. /d. at 910. 
28. 119 u.s. 199, 213 (1886). 
29. /d. 
30. Id. 
31. E.g., The Little Silver, 189 F. 980, 987 (D.N.J. 1911) (recovery for loss of injured 
wife's aid, comfort, and society), aff'd sub nom. New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co. 
v. Johnson, 195 F. 740 (3d Cir. 1912); Maryland v. Miller, 180 F. 796, 811 (D. Md. 1910) 
(recovery for loss of injured wife's services and companionship), modified, 194 F. 775 (4th 
Cir. 1911) (husband's recovery affirmed), cert. denied, 225 U.S. 703 (1912); The St. Nicho-
las, 49 F. 671, 673 (S.D. Ga. 1891) (action included claim for husband's loss of comfort 
and services); accord, Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 891,892 (Story, Circuit Justice, 1827) 
(No. 11,233); Cutting v. Seabury, 6 F. Cas. 1083, 1084 (D. Mass. 1860) (No. 3521). 
32. 195 F. 740 (3d Cir. 1912). 
33. /d. at 742. The district court's decision enumerated the elements of Mr. Johnson's 
claim, i.e., deprivation of the aid, comfort, and society of his wife. The Little Silver, 189 
F. 980, 987 (D.N.J. 1911). 
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The Sea Gull, 34 The Highland Light, 35 and Plummer v. Webb 36 
-all admiralty death cases that had recognized loss of services 
or society as proper damage elements in admiralty. 37 Although 
The Harrisburg had invalidated the general maritime wrongful 
death action, the court in Johnson found that the damage ele-
ments of lost aid, comfort, and society were still proper since the 
husband's cause of action was a valid maritime tort.38 
After the Johnson decision, courts continued to allow mari-
time claims of husbands in nonfatal injury cases for loss of consor-
tium, services, and society .39 In Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 40 
for example, the Ninth Circuit allowed an injured passenger and 
her husband to recover for her injuries and his loss of society, 
services, and consortium, which had been occasioned by the 
wife's shipboard fall:u Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has affirmed 
a maritime recovery for loss of an injured wife's services.42 
Although injuries to the consortium interests of husbands 
have been compensated in admiralty courts, no early cases have 
been identified granting the same relief to the wife of a man 
injured at sea. 43 
Ill. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMIRALTY 
Since 1960, there have been two pivotal cases in admiralty 
bearing on the question of consortium. lgneri v. Cie. de Trans-
ports Oceaniques"" is the leading case denying a wife's maritime 
claim for loss of consortium based on nonfatal injury to her hus-
band. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet45 marked the redeclara-
34. 21 F. Cas. 909 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1865) (No. 12,578). 
35. 12 F. Cas. 138 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1867) (No. 6477). 
36. 19 F. Cas. 891 (Story, Circuit Justice, 1827) (No. 11,233). 
37. 195 F. 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1912). 
38. Id. at 741. 
39. E.g., Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 225 F.2d 273, 274 (9th Cir. 1958); In re 
Wood, 145 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D. Mo. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, 
Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957). 
40. 255 F .2d 273 (9th Cir. 1958). 
41. Id. at 274, 282. Although the court declined to specify whether maritime law or 
state law was applied in measuring the defendant's liability, the court did note that the 
husband and wife would be permitted to bring their suit under either maritime or state 
law. /d. at 277 & n.5. 
42. Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1957). The 
district court decision specified that the recovery included damages for loss of services. 
In re Wood, 145 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D. Mo. 1956). 
43. See lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1963). 
44. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963). 
45. 414 u.s. 573 (1974). 
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tion of the right to recover in admiralty for injury to consortium 
interests in the instance of the spouse's death. Since these cases 
significantly affect the resolution of the consortium issue in non-
fatal cases, they merit close examination. 
A. Initial Denial of the Wife's Claim for Loss of Consortium 
In the 1963 case of lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 
the Second Circuit expressly denied a wife's maritime action for 
loss of consortium.46 In addition to denying the wife's cause of 
action, which sought recovery based on injuries to her longshore-
man husband, the court indicated that it would also deny a claim 
for loss of consortium brought by the husband of an injured 
woman seaworkerY The court disagreed with the Johnson hold-
ing, criticizing Johnson's use of overruled wrongful death cases to 
support recovery for loss of consortium in an injury action, but 
did not comment on any of the other cases that had awarded 
damages to husbands of injured women in admiralty. 48 Thelgneri 
court contended that the precedents cited in Johnson had been 
overruled in The Harrisburg and went beyond the traditional 
damages allowed in admiralty by granting relief for nonpecuniary 
elements, such as loss of comfort and society.49 No authority was 
provided from general maritime law to support the claim that 
nonpecuniary damages were not the tradition in admiralty, but 
rather the court cited cases that construed federal wrongful death 
statutes to deny such damages.50 
The court based its denial of the consortium claim on three 
grounds. First, it found the common law jurisdictions in conflict. 
At the time of the decision, thirty-one American jurisdictions had 
decided the question of a wife's consortium action: nineteen had 
denied the wife's action and twelve had allowed it.51 With such a 
lack of uniformity among the jurisdictions, the court was unper-
suaded that the common law position supported granting the 
wife's claim.52 However, the court noted that if uniformity had 
existed, it would have created a "gravitational pull" on admiralty 
to allow the action.53 
46. 323 F.2d 257, 268 (2d Cir. 1963). 
47. ld. 
48. ld. at 265. 
49. ld. 
50. ld. 
51. ld. at 260-61. 
52. I d. at 267. 
53. ld. 
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Second, the court looked to the Jones Act54 and the Death on 
the High Seas Act (DOHSA)55 for analogy. The Jones Act was 
established in 1920 to allow seamen or their beneficiaries to 
recover from employers for injury or death caused by the em-
ployer's negligence. 56 Negligence actions had been previously per-
mitted under general maritime law, 57 but not when brought by a 
seaman. 58 DOH SA, which was also enacted in 1920, provided 
wrongful death relief for negligently caused death occurring on 
the high seas.59 Both statutes, as lgneri noted,60 have been con-
strued to deny relief for nonpecuniary losses such as loss of society 
or consortium.61 Igneri asserted that it would be anomalous to 
allow recovery for loss of consortium under a general maritime 
negligence action when it is denied in the statutory remedies of 
both the Jones Act and DORSA. 62 
Third, the court refused to extend the coverage of the doc-
trine of unseaworthiness to the wife's claim for loss of consor-
tium. 63 The doctrine of unseaworthiness places an absolute duty 
on the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel.64 The shipowner 
is held strictly liable for injuries to seamen caused by the unsea-
worthiness of the ship. Justification for such special protection 
has generally been based on the high risk work of the seaman. 65 
Igneri found it appropriate to limit the scope of the absolute 
protection of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to the one directly 
or physically injured. 66 
54. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970). 
55. 46 u.s.c. §§ 761-768 (1970). 
56. For a discussion of the Jones Act and its purposes, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, 
supra note 6, § 6-20, at 325-28. 
57. I d. § 6-4, at 278. 
58. E.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
59. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). For a general discussion ofDOHSA, see G. Gn.MORE & C. 
BLACK, supra note 6, § 6-31, at 364-65. 
60. 323 F.2d at 266 & n.21. 
61. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1961); 
Middleton v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934); Tate v. C.G. Willis, 
Inc., 154 F. Supp. 402, 403 (E.D. Va. 1957); Gerardo v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 383, 
385 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Westerberg v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 304 N.Y. 545, 110 N.E.2d 
395 (1953). 
62. 323 F.2d at 267. 
63. ld. at 267-68. 
64. E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946); Mahnich v. South-
em S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1944). 
65. E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946); Mahnich v. South-
em S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1944). See generally G. Gn.MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 
6, § 6-41, at 392-93. 
66. lgneri recognized that the wife's relational interests may have been real, but those 
interests ranked lower in qualifying for economic protection than the person of the hus-
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Some courts hearing injury cases subsequent to lgneri and 
prior to Gaudet adopted the Second Circuit view that loss of 
consortium is not recoverable in admiralty. 67 
B. Re-creation of the General Maritime Wrongful Death Action 
In 1970, the Supreme Court removed the barrier that pre-
vented admiralty recoveries for loss of consortium in wrongful 
death cases. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 68 the Court 
unanimously overturned The Harrisburg, which had proscribed a 
maritime wrongful death action absent statutory authorization. 69 
In judicially declaring the existence of a general maritime wrong-
ful death action, Moragne resurrected the admiralty concept of 
liberal and humanitarian relief, which had been embraced in the 
pre-Harrisburg wrongful death cases.70 Moragne's broad declara-
tion of a general maritime cause of action for wrongful death has 
been described as reducing the specific maritime wrongful death 
statutes, i.e., the Jones Act and DOH SA, to the status of non-
statutory restatements of the law. 71 Moragne left the various 
potential damage elements of the re-created wrongful death 
action to be sifted in the lower courts. 72 After some years of 
refining the permissible damages, the lower courts had arrived at 
no clear consensus regarding societal losses. 73 
C. Recovery of Societal Losses in Wrongful Death Cases 
In 1974, the Supreme Court's decision in Sea-Land Services, 
Inc. v. Gaudet permitted a longshoreman's widow to maintain a 
Moragne wrongful death action under the doctrine of unseawor-
thiness.74 The widow's claim was allowed despite a recovery by 
band. 323 F.2d at 268. As justification for that decision, the court stated, "When our law 
imposes strict liability, it often accompanies this with limitations, not existing in the case 
of liability based on fault, as to amount, as to person benefited, or as to both." I d. 
67. E.g., Sanseverino v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 276 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D. Md. 1967); David-
son v. Schlussel Reederei KG, 295 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Rogers v. City of 
New York, 46 Misc. 2d 373, 377, 295 N.Y.S.2d 604, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
68. 398 u.s. 375 (1970). 
69. Id. at 378, 404-05. 
70. I d. at 387. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
71. G. Gn.MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, § 6-32, at 367-68. 
72. 398 U.S. at 408. 
73. Most courts were denying recovery for societal losses. E.g., In re MN Elaine 
Jones, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973); In reUnited States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th 
Cir. 1970); Savard v. Marine Contracting, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Conn. 1969). Contra, 
In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. La. 1971); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 
329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971). 
74. 414 u.s. 573, 574-75 (1974). 
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the husband for his personal injuries prior to his death.75 The 
Court announced that appropriate damages in a general mari-
time wrongful death case could include compensation for loss of 
support, services, and society, as well as funeral expenses.76 
Gaudet did not face the issue of loss of consortium or society 
in nonfatal cases. Recognizing, however, that wrongful death re-
coveries for injuries to relational interests were relied on in 
Johnson to justify such a recovery in a nonfatal case, 77 a review 
of the Gaudet decision is appropriate. 
The traditional objections to consortium actions, which had 
been raised and refuted in most land courts by 1974,78 were like-
wise rejected in Gaudet for maritime wrongful death actions for 
loss of society. First, the Court dismissed the contention that 
societal damages would be too speculative by pointing out that 
juries often calculate damages for pain and suffering and that 
consortium losses would be no more difficult to compute.79 The 
Court noted that admiralty courts, as well as common law courts, 
had previously awarded damages for loss of consortium in nonfa-
tal injury cases. 80 
Second, the Court perceived no threat of double recovery by 
husbands and wives that could not be remedied by procedural 
75. /d. 
76. /d. at 584. The Court indicated that consortium encompasses society, and society 
was defined to include "love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and 
protection." /d. at 585 & n.17, 589. The Supreme Court's recognition of services and 
society as compensable interests is relevant to an analysis of loss of consortium or society 
in nonfatal admiralty cases and will be more fully examined. The recovery allowed for loss 
of support and funeral expenses has only incidental impact on the present question. 
77. Notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra. 
78. State courts have faced and resolved the following four basic objections to the 
cause of action for loss of consortium. First, there is a potential for double recovery from 
defendants if both spouses can maintain actions based on one physical injury. Second, 
damages to the spouse who claims loss of consortium may be too speculative or remote to 
justify compensation. Third, if the relational interests between spouses are granted protec-
tion, a barrage of others with similar relational interests may descend on the courts also 
seeking protection for their interests. Fourth, some have urged that the decision to grant 
or deny consortium actions should be left to the legislatures. 
For penetrating analyses and treatment of these objections in favor of allowing the 
cause of action, see Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 
Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); 
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 
305 (1968). 
79. 414 U.S. at 589. 
80. /d. at 589 & n.25. Although the Supreme Court cited Johnson as an admiralty 
case granting recovery for loss of consortium, it should be mentioned that the Court did 
not thereby necessarily express approval of the Johnson decision, since the Court also 
noted that lgneri represented a contrary view. 
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controls and, in fact, declared that the only risk of a second recov-
ery was for the loss of Mr. Gaudet's support, since he had pre-
viously obtained a personal injury recovery.81 The Court empha-
sized that there was no threat of overlap between the husband's 
personal injury action and the wife's recovery for services or so-
ciety, as the right of action for those elements accrued not to the 
husband, but uniquely to his dependants. 82 The opinion under-
scored the fact that no overlap could have existed in this case by 
commenting that the wife's claims for services, society, and fu-
neral expenses "could not accrue until the [husband's] death."83 
Third, a frequent objection to common law consortium ac-
tions has been that defendants would be subjected to a multiplic-
ity of suits by any number of others with some relationship to the 
physically injured person. 84 The Gaudet decision did not raise this 
issue, but the Court apparently did not share such an apprehen-
sion. The Court indicated that remedy should be extended not 
only to the spouse, but to all of the decedent's other dependents 
as well.85 
Fourth, some courts terrane have argued that if change is 
desirable, it should be effectuated by the legislatures.86 The Su-
preme Court did not embrace this view. In fact, the Gaudet opin-
ion judicially declared the right to recover societal losses despite 
legislative implication to the contrary. The dissent noted that the 
Jones Act and DOHSA have been read to deny consortium 
claims,87 but the majority was not deterred from permitting the 
cause of action. 88 
In addition to resolving the above objections, the Court also 
turned to the common law position on wrongful death recovery 
to find support in granting relief for loss of society. The Court 
81. ld. at 591-92. 
82. Id. 
83. ld. at 592. This dictum was subsequently relied on by the Fifth Circuit as a clear 
expression by the Supreme Court that the loss of consortium should not be recoverable in 
admiralty unless the claimant's spouse is killed. See Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 
534 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Christofferson, see notes 92-96, 
116-122 and accompanying text infra. 
84. E.g., McKey v. Dow Chern. Co., 295 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974). 
85. 414 U.S. at 584. 
86. E.g., Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347, 349 (Wyo. 1971); Roseberry v. Stark-
ovich, 73 N.M. 211, 218, 387 P.2d 321, 326-27 (1963); Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 
2d 345, 350, 261 P.2d 118, 120 (1953). 
87. 414 U.S. at 605-06 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
88. The decision expressly noted that DOHSA recoveries were restricted to pecuniary 
losses, but the Court opted to permit claims for nonpecuniary losses under the general 
maritime wrongful death action. I d. at 586-87. 
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found what was referred to as a "clear majority" of the jurisdic-
tions granting such recoveries. 89 Besides aligning the maritime 
position with the majority of the states, Gaudet reaffirmed admi-
ralty's adherence to the earlier proclaimed principles of humani-
tarian and liberal relief. The Court commented that it felt com-
pelled to allow the remedy to comply with the "humanitarian 
policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for those 
who are injured within its jurisdiction. "90 
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly established protection of 
relational interests in admiralty cases involving death. 91 But the 
question of a claim for loss of consortium in cases of serious injury 
was not answered. In cases subsequent to Gaudet, divergent views 
on the issue have arisen. 
D. The Present Uncertain Status of Consortium in Nonfatal 
Cases 
In Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 92 the only federal appel-
late decision since Gaudet addressing recovery for loss of consor-
tium in a nonfatal situation, the Fifth Circuit took a strict stare 
decisis approach. The court relied on lgneri as the most recent 
precedent relating to a wife's claim in nonfatal cases, but did not 
reevaluate that case's rationale.93 Further, Christofferson simply 
distinguished the recovery in Gaudet as a death action94 and ig-
nored a plea that the principles of liberality and humanitarian 
relief affirmed by the Supreme Court should apply equally where 
the spouse is only seriously injured. 95 Instead of seeing support in 
Gaudet for the nonfatal claim, the court interpreted Gaudet as 
being authority to deny the claim by relying primarily on the 
Supreme Court's dictum in Gaudet that the wife's loss of society 
and services did not "accrue until [her husband's] death."96 
In contrast, one federal district court and one state court in 
post-Gaudet admiralty cases have declared the right of spouses 
89. ld. at 587 & n.21. 
90. ld. at 588. 
91. Lower courts have consistently followed the Gaudet decision in wrongful death 
cases. E.g., Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1975); Renner v. 
Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Hammill v. Olympic Air-
ways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829, 837-38 (D.D.C. 1975). 
92. 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976). 
93. ld. at 1149-50. 
94. ld. at 1150. 
95. ld. at 1152-53 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
96. ld. at 1150 (quoting from Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 592). 
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to recover in injury cases for lost consorti urn. 97 These courts were 
unable to justify granting relief to the widow or widower while 
denying it to one whose spouse is severely injured. Another fed-
eral district court implied that loss of consortium upon nonfatal 
injury is recoverable in admiralty and noted that although 
Gaudet did not directly face this issue, it apparently did not 
disapprove of such relief since the Supreme Court relied on 
Johnson in justifying relief for the fatal cases.98 
The present uncertainty generated by these opposing opin-
ions is compounded by the conflict between the Second Circuit's 
stand in lgneri against consortium claims by either spouse99 and 
the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits' past histories of 
granting recovery to husbands for loss of society, consortium, or 
services. 100 
A resolution of the conflict can best be suggested following 
an examination of three factors: (1) the effect of admiralty's past 
treatment of the consortium question, (2) the impact of the 
changing common law position on consortium, and (3) the influ-
ence of the wrongful death recoveries for loss of consortium in 
admiralty. 
IV. JusTIFICATIONS FOR NoNFATAL CoNSORTIUM AcTIONS IN 
ADMIRALTY 
A. Consortium's Past in Admiralty 
A basic justification for a remedy for lost consortium in in-
jury cases is the simple fact that such recoveries have been pre-
viously allowed in admiralty. Despite the Second Circuit's ill-
supported statement that the tradition of admiralty is to restrict 
damages to those of a pecuniary nature, 101 there is a substantial 
history of recoveries of nonpecuniary damages in maritime courts, 
which have been based on relational interests in both fatal 102 and 
nonfataP03 cases. Although the past recoveries cannot necessarily 
97. Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Pesce v. 
Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 86, 92, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451, 454-55 (1975). 
98. Francis v. Pan Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 n.8 (D. Del. 1975). 
99. 323 F.2d 257, 268 (2d Cir. 1963). Notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. 
100. Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 255 F.2d 273, 274, 282 (9th Cir. 1958); Loc-
Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1957); New York & 
Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 195 F. 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1912); Maryland v. 
Miller, 194 F. 775 (4th Cir. 1911). Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra. 
101. lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1963). Notes 
49-50 and accompanying text supra. 
102. Note 25 and accompanying text supra. 
103. Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra. 
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demand a like result today, deviation therefrom should not be 
made lightly. 
The past recoveries in nonfatal injury cases have involved 
only husbands, but it is doubtful today that a restriction based 
on sex could be maintained}04 If a husband's cause of action for 
loss of consortium has continued viability in admiralty, the wife 
should not be denied equivalent protection for her entitlement to 
the elements of consortium in the marriage relation. Certainly the 
loss to a wife, who is deprived of the love, comfort, society, and 
companionship of her spouse, is no less severe than a similar loss 
sustained by a husband. 
Both the Second Circuit in lgneri and the Fifth Circuit in 
Christofferson felt justified in denying consortium recoveries to 
spouses under the general maritime law, since recoveries for in-
jury under the Jones Act provisions have traditionally been lim-
ited to the one directly injured}05 Thus, it is argued that the 
apparent intent of Congress to deny a statutory recovery for loss 
of consortium should be carried over to the general maritime 
negligence action. Following this rationale would avoid the anom-
aly of granting compensation to some spouses under the general 
maritime law but denying it to others under the Jones Act. 
In contrast to this reasoning it should first be noted that 
historically recoveries for loss of consortium and services have 
been allowed under the general maritime law despite the exis-
tence of the Jones Act and its restrictive rule}06 Second, the Su-
preme Court undermined any reliance on analogy to the Jones 
Act by expressly granting a recovery for· loss of society in a fatal 
injury case, despite the denial of such relief under both the Jones 
Act and DOHSA. 107 1f an analogy to the statutes was unpersuasive 
in the case of general maritime wrongful death actions, the same 
result should be expected in a negligent injury case. 
In addition to consortium actions based on negligence, the 
propriety of such claims based on unseaworthiness should be 
examined. The Second Circuit hesitated to expand the strict lia-
bility doctrine of unseaworthiness to provide protection for the 
marital interests of the spouse, particularly since that doctrine 
imposes strict liability on shipowners. 108 The Supreme Court, 
104. See, e.g., Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974) (equi-
valent treatment of husband and wife constitutionally demanded). 
105. 534 F.2d 1147, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1976); 323 F.2d 257, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1963). 
106. Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra. 
107. Notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra. 
108. lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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however, undermined this position when it allowed recovery for 
loss of society and services under this very doctrine in Gaudet. 109 
The application of the unseaworthiness doctrine is arguably as 
appropriate in the nonfatal case. In fatal and nonfatal cases alike, 
the consortium interests of a seaman's spouse are subject to the 
same probability of injury as is the person of the seaman in the 
hazardous work at sea. As long as Gaudet remains the law for 
wrongful death, it would be difficult to justify a contrary result 
in injury cases. 
B. The "Gravitational Pull" of the Common Law 
Although the common law is not determinative in admiralty, 
it is persuasive. The Second Circuit found a lack of uniformity 
among the courts terrane in 1963 when Igneri was decided, but 
these courts are presently approaching unanimity in granting re-
lief for loss of consortium in nonfatal cases. 110 This increasing 
number of states permitting recovery has intensified the common 
• law's "gravitational pull" on admiralty. 
The strength of the common law stand, with forty jurisdic-
tions having allowed nonfatal consortium actions, should not be 
ignored, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's willingness 
in Gaudet to align the maritime position with a majority of only 
twenty-seven of forty-four land jurisdictions. 111 Certainly if admi-
ralty is to take a position opposite the onrushing tide of states 
that allow recovery in injury cases, substantial justification 
should be forthcoming. Additionally, it would seem highly incon-
sistent for the admiralty courts, which profess liberality and 
humanitarian relief, to be more strict than the courts terrane, 
which now generally grant relief for injury to a spouse's consor-
tium interests. 
C. Analogy to the General Maritime Wrongful Death Action 
With consortium interests so clearly protected under the gen-
eral maritime wrongful death action, 112 it is worthwhile to assess 
whether a like or contrary result is appropriate in the case of 
nonfatal injury. The early general maritime wrongful death cases 
provided protection for relational interests. Although The 
Notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra. 
109. 414 u.s. 573, 574-75 (1974). 
110. Note 22 and accompanying text supra. 
111. 414 U.S. 573, 587 & n.21 (1974). Text accompanying note 89 supra. 
112. Note 91 and accompanying text supra. 
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Harrisburg overruled those decisions, the Supreme Court has 
subsequently exonerated the reasoning and policy of those early 
cases. lgneri criticized the Third Circuit's use of the pre-
Harrisburg wrongful death cases in justifying an inter vivos recov-
ery for the elements of consortium, but it should again be noted 
that The Harrisburg had not questioned the compensability of 
lost society, services, or consortium for admiralty torts. 113 It only 
announced that future wrongful death cases (whether for consor-
tium or otherwise) could not be maintained without statutory 
authorization. Thus, the Third Circuit's reliance in Johnson on 
the declarations that societal relationships were protected inter-
ests in admiralty was probably not misplaced. In any case, the 
Supreme Court saw the error of the Harrisburg rule by reinstating 
the general maritime wrongful death action in Moragne 114 and 
redeclaring the propriety of allowing recovery for societal losses 
in Gaudet. 115 
The most likely justification for overruling the Johnson view 
and restricting recovery to fatal cases would be a reliance on the 
Supreme Court's statement in Gaudet that loss of services and 
society (and thus consortium) could not accrue until death. Such 
was the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Christofferson. 116 Several fac-
tors, however, appear to discredit Christofferson's interpretation 
of the Gaudet statement. First, the context of the statement does 
not concern the issue of maintaining a nonfatal action for loss of 
services or society. The Court was not facing that issue. In the 
portion of the opinion containing the statement, the Supreme 
Court· was drawing the clearest possible distinction between the 
husband's inter vivos recovery and the wife's postmortem recov-
ery to prove the absence of overlap between the claims. The crux 
of the argument was that her claims for society and services were 
unique to her, and he had no part therein. 117 No suggestion what-
ever was made that overlap would have existed had she made an 
inter vivos claim for loss of consortium, joined with his personal 
injury claim. 
Second, elsewhere in the opinion the Court supported its 
position that loss of society was a proper and measurable element 
of loss in the case of fatality by stressing that admiralty courts 
113. 119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886). Note 30 and accompanying text supra. 
114. 398 u.s. 375, 378, 404-05 (1970). 
115. 414 u.s. 573, 584 (1974). 
116. 534 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1976). Note 96 and accompanying text supra. 
117. 414 U.S. 573, 591-92 (1974). Notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra. 
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had previously granted recoveries for loss of consortium in injury 
cases. 118 If the Court was not expressing approval of the nonfatal 
consortium actions, at least it recognized the reality of their past 
existence. Similarly, numerous admiralty actions have been 
maintained for loss of services in nonfatal cases, and the Supreme 
Court did not quarrel with the propriety of these suits. 119 Cer-
tainly the loss of domestic and household services described by 
the Supreme Court,t20 for which compensation is permitted in a 
wrongful death case, would be potentially a very real element of 
damage in a case where the spouse is seriously disabled. 
Finally, if the dictum regarding accrual of loss was intended 
to preclude inter vivos recoveries for loss of consortium, no sup-
porting justification was provided. It is unlikely that the Court 
would summarily abolish future consortium claims in nonfatal 
injury cases without some explanation, especially since the Court 
had expressly recognized their prior occurance in admiralty. 121 
Perhaps the better explanation is the one urged by the dis-
sent in Christofferson 122-that the Supreme Court was speaking 
to the accrual of the wrongful death cause of action as a whole, 
which occurs after death. In any case, whatever the Supreme 
Court intended in its dictum, it is not likely that it was a prohibi-
tion of nonfatal consortium actions. 
Another possible justification for drawing the line of recovery 
at death lies in the assertion that the injury to the marriage 
relationship is remedied through the claim of the physically in-
jured spouse in the nonfatal case, but that in the case of fatality, 
the spouse can recover independently for societal losses through 
a wrongful death action. It is not only difficult to formulate plau-
sible support for that position, but such an assertion is also incon-
sistent with the Gaudet proceeding. If in admiralty an inter vivos 
recovery includes compensation for both the physical injuries and 
the injury to the marital relationship, then Mr. Gaudet made full 
recovery for Mrs. Gaudet in his personal injury suit before his 
death. However, a personal injury action in admiralty apparently 
does not rectify the societal losses of the spouse. Otherwise, Mrs. 
Gaudet's subsequent recovery would have been denied. It is 
118. ld. at 589 & n.25. Note 80 and accompanying text supra. 
119. Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra. 
120. The Supreme Court enumerated the loss of "the nurture, training, education, 
and guidance" of children as well as "[s]ervices ... performed at home or for [the] 
spouse" as compensable services. 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). 
121. /d. at 589 & n.25. 
122. 534 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1976) (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
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doubtful that Mr. Gaudet was held to recover for injury to his 
wife's consortium interests up to the point of death and that she 
was allowed to recover for the lost society only as it was intensi-
fied by his death. There was, in fact, no clarification that her 
damages were to be only for any increment of loss caused by 
death. 
The existence of a cause of action for loss of consortium in 
the case of death argues strongly for its uniform recognition by 
admiralty courts in cases of nonfatal injury. The losses sustained 
by the spouse of one who is injured may often be more intense 
than those of the widow or widower, particularly in the face of the 
possibility of remarriage by one whose spouse was killed, where 
some possible fulfillment in a subsequent marriage relationship 
is possible. For the one who remains faithful and devoted to a 
permanently incapacitated spouse, however, there is no such op-
portunity. As great as the total loss at death may be, the surviv-
ing spouse is not left with the lifelong nursing of a loved one who 
is now incapable of reciprocating with comfort, companionship, 
services, and society in some degree. Thus, if the widow and 
widower are entitled to remedy for lost consortium, relief is just 
as appropriate for spouses of the maimed and crippled. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Admiralty boasts of providing "special solicitude" for those 
injured within its jurisdiction. 123 A remedy for one who is harmed 
under that umbrella should be liberally granted, according to the 
Supreme Court, unless it is precluded by "established and inflex-
ible rules." 124 A severe physical injury to a man or woman may 
result in a real and distinct injury to the spouse who loses the 
consortium of the physically injured spouse. There are no 
"established and inflexible rules" in admiralty that would pre-
clude compensation for such harm. In fact, the history of past 
recoveries in admiralty, the present trends among land jurisdic-
tions, and the current decisions permitting such claims in mari-
time wrongful death cases all argue convincingly for a clear decla-
ration of the right of spouses to pursue claims for loss of consor-
tium in nonfatal cases. 125 Although a clarification of the law would 
123. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 (1974). 
124. /d. at 583. 
125. It is significant to note that when the Fifth Circuit recently denied a consortium 
claim that was based on a nonfatal injury, the court indicated that such a stand against 
the action may not persist. The opinion stated, "Persuasive as the arguments may be that 
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be proper for congressional action, legislative intervention is not 
required. Congress has left the shaping of the law of admiralty 
primarily to the courts, 126 and a judicial declaration of the right 
of spouses to recover for loss of consortium in admiralty, based 
on nonfatal injury, is not only permissible, but clearly warranted. 
the law is changing, we hold that it has not changed yet . . . . " Christofferson v. Hallibur-
ton Co., 534 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1976). 
126. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 n.22 (1974); Fitzgerald v. 
United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963). 
